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May’s	Brexit	luck	looks	like	running	out	at
Westminster	this	autumn
Theresa	May’s	strategy	of	procrastination	and	ambiguity	is	about	to	run	out,	writes	Jim	Gallagher
(University	of	Glasgow).	While	she	may,	even	after	Salzburg,	be	able	to	agree	a	form	of	words
with	Brussels,	the	fudge	involved	is	now	so	transparent	it	is	unlikely	to	satisfy	enough	MPs	to	get
the	deal	through	Parliament.	This	makes	a	disorderly	exit	–	or	a	second	referendum	–	more
probable	outcomes.
As	the	deadline	nears,	the	noise	increases	and	the	Brexit	options	get	starker.	Theresa	May’s
strategy	of	kicking	the	can	down	the	road,	fudging	the	long-term	relationship	with	the	EU	in	the	hope	of	maintaining
Conservative	party	unity	–	which	I	have	explained	here	before	–	might	just	have	worked,	but	is	probably	going	to	fail.
The	options	are	then	chaos,	or	another	vote.	Here	is	why,	how	it	is	all	likely	to	play	out,	and	what	it	might	mean.
The	withdrawal	agreement
Theresa	May	in	Salzburg	on	19	September	2018.	Photo:	CC-BY-NC-ND	2.0	licence
A	withdrawal	agreement	is	largely	straightforward,	and	taken	down	at	dictation	speed	from	Michel	Barnier.	In	this,	he
has	not	been	unreasonable.	The	UK	pays	its	outstanding	debts,	deals	decently	with	EU	citizens	who	have	made	their
homes	here,	and	transitions	into	a	new	relationship	to	avoid	no	cliff-edge	in	2019.	The	difficult	bit	remains	the	“Irish
backstop”.	It	gives	legal	effect	to	the	UK’s	promises,	made	twice	in	these	negotiations	and	in	Treaty	commitments	to
the	Republic	of	Ireland,	that	there	will	be	no	hard	border	on	the	island	of	Ireland.	That	means	no	checks	for	tariff	or
regulatory	purposes	on	goods	crossing	the	border:	anything	else	–	however	fancy	the	technology	–	is	hard	enough	to
matter.
The	bit	isn’t	yet	agreed	because	of	its	link	to	the	long-term	relationship.	May	would	like	to	fudge	it	more	for	that
reason:	but	she’s	already	promised	too	much	to	leave	a	lot	of	wiggle	room,	and	in	any	event	the	EU	made	it	clear	last
week	that	it	will	insist	on	a	robust	legal	text	–	even	if	the	Republic	of	Ireland	loses	its	nerve	in	this	game	of	chicken.
The	long	run
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All	that	can	be	expected	before	we	leave	is	a	political	declaration	on	the	new	relationship.	It	is	easy	to	say	that	the
new	UK-EU	relationship	will	be	different	from	anything	that	has	gone	before	and	tailored	to	these	specific
circumstances.	The	rhetoric	of	any	declaration	will	no	doubt	trumpet	this.	But	in	reality	there	are	only	two	basic
models	to	choose	from:	like	Canada	–	outside	the	EU’s	customs	area	and	regulatory	systems	–	or	inside	them,	as	in
the	EEA/EFTA	relationship.	However	the	new	relationship	is	dressed	up,	it	has	to	make	this	choice.
May’s	Chequers	plan	tried	to	avoid	choosing:	an	ingenious,	Heath	Robinson,	arrangement	in	which	the	UK	somehow
manages	to	be	both	inside	and	outside	the	customs	union	at	the	same	time.	Maybe	in	a	parallel	universe	this	could
have	developed	over	many	decades,	but	isn’t	going	to	happen	in	this	one.	Barnier’s	warm	words	about	a	deal	this
autumn	were	all	about	the	Withdrawal	Agreement:	his	reaction	to	the	customs	plan	was	always	unambiguously
negative	,	and	this	was	confirmed	bluntly	in	Salzburg	last	week	when	May	overplayed	her	hand.
Hence	the	problem	with	the	Irish	backstop.	After	Britain	leaves,	it	will	have	an	external	border	with	the	EU27.	This
could	prove	problematic	enough	if	there	are	to	be	customs	and	regulatory	checks	at	Dover.	But	promising	there	will
be	no	hard	border	along	the	fractal	line	between	the	six	and	26	counties	inevitably	implies	either	that	the	UK	is	within
the	customs	and	regulatory	frameworks	of	the	EU,	or	some	form	of	border	checks	across	the	Irish	Sea.	May’s
strategy	throughout	has	been	to	pretend	this	dilemma	does	not	exist,	and	that	an	arrangement	which	avoids	the
choice	will	somehow	emerge	after	we	leave.	Salzburg,	and	her	uncompromising	reaction	to	it	afterwards,	makes	it
much	harder	to	pretend	that	circle	can	be	squared.
At	this	stage	in	the	negotiation	her	aim	has	been	a	broad,	vague,	ambiguous	political	declaration	on	trade	which
simply	asserts	that	the	new	relationship	will	both	be	consistent	with	the	Irish	backstop	and	not	require	an	internal
border	of	any	sort	inside	the	UK.	She	hoped	to	described	this	as	something	like	“negotiating	on	the	basis	of	the
Chequers	package”,	but	that	won’t	fly	now.
For	his	part,	Barnier	would	still	nevertheless	probably	buy	fudge	for	now,	provided	the	Irish	backstop	wording	is
sufficiently	watertight.	His	negotiating	position	can	only	be	stronger	after	we	have	left.	Chequers	is	not	going	to
happen,	and	it	will	be	the	UK’s	problem	either	to	impose	an	internal	border	in	the	event	of	a	Canada	deal	(which	he	is
offering	to	make	as	unobtrusive	as	possible),	or	to	sell	membership	of	the	customs	union	and	single	market	to	the
British	people.	The	question	is	whether	the	UK	Parliament	will	buy	such	a	pig	in	a	poke.
The	endgame	in	Westminster
	Oppositions	oppose,	so	Labour,	SNP	and	the	Liberal	Democrats	will	vote	against	whatever	May	proposes.	Her	only
hope	of	support	there	would	lie	in	proposing	to	stay	in	the	customs	union	and	single	market.	She	shows	no	sign	of
doing	that,	as	it	would	split	her	party.	(Robert	Peel	did	the	right	thing	for	the	country	over	the	corn	laws,	but	in	the
eyes	of	Brexiteers,	splitting	the	Tory	party	made	it	the	wrong	thing.	He	must	be	spinning	is	his	grave)
So	May’s	plan	depends	on	the	small,	fragile	coalition	that	constitutes	her	majority.	She	needs	a	form	of	words,	and	a
legal	text	for	the	Irish	backstop,	which	is	sufficiently	vague	to	get	at	the	same	time	the	support	of	the	relatively	small
number	of	Tory	remainers,	the	larger	number	of	diehard	Brexiteers,	and	of	course	the	DUP.	They	all	have	to	believe
this	ambiguous	package	is	going	to	give	them	what	they	want.	And	as	she	digs	herself	in	deeper	demanding
Chequers,	she	makes	it	all	the	clearer	that	they	can’t	all	be	right,
Some	Brexiteers	–	like	Michael	Gove	–	take	the	view	that	getting	out	is	the	big	prize,	and	if	necessary	the	UK	can
become	Canada	at	a	later	stage.	Others	would	happily	have	a	hard	border	in	Ireland.	But	Jacob	Rees-Mogg’s
European	Research	group	condemned	Chequers	and	the	idea	of	compromise,	and	the	DUP	will	baulk	at	anything
that	hints	at	a	border	between	Ulster	and	Britain.	Figures	like	Dominic	Grieve,	who	has	fought	to	get	Parliament	a
decisive	say	over	the	deal,	will	struggle	to	swallow	such	blatant	ambiguities	in	the	deal.
So	it	is	quite	possible	May’s	strategy	of	procrastination	and	ambiguity	will	come	to	a	screeching	halt	in	Parliament
this	autumn.	It	will	be	her	fault.	There	will	likely	be	a	majority	against	her	deal,	no	majority	for	any	other	plan,	and
certainly	none	for	no	deal.	In	these	circumstances,	no	withdrawal	legislation	will	pass.	What	happens	then?
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One	possibility	is	a	general	election,	perhaps	after	repeated	votes	of	confidence.	The	party	which	wants	to	be	sure	of
winning	need	only	offer	another	vote	on	Europe.	Alternatively,	Parliament	could	go	straight	to	another	vote.	Exactly
how	is	not	obvious.	It	is	one	of	the	many	things	May	has	ruled	out,	but	she	could	offer	the	people	a	choice	between
her	plan	and	remaining.	Alternatively,	there	could	be	a	high-stakes	agreement	between	Remainers	and	Leavers	that
since	government	cannot	negotiate	acceptable	terms	on	which	to	leave	the	EU,	the	country	has	to	make	a	stark
choice	between	remaining	and	exiting	with	no	deal.	We	are	up	against	a	deadline	of	next	March,	but	it	seems	likely
that	the	EU	would	agree	to	a	deferral	for	the	purposes	of	a	referendum.
Coping	with	the	consequences
Perhaps	May	will	pull	it	off,	and	will	have	demonstrated	the	tactical	guile	of	a	Lloyd	George	in	steering	through	an
impossible	set	of	constraints.	But	she	has	shown	little	sign	of	that,	and	it	seems	likely	that	the	UK	will	face	a	choice
between	reconsidering	and	a	disorderly	exit.	The	inevitable	national	humiliation	of	either	option	less	worrying	than
the	complete	destruction	of	trust	between	large	sections	of	the	population	and	the	institutions	of	national
government.	The	next	government	will	have	to	address	that	problem	head-on,	and	deal	not	just	with	Brexit,	but	the
causes	of	Brexit.
Those	causes	are	profound,	but	historians	will	see	this	mess	as	the	consequence	of	David	Cameron	and	Theresa
May	putting	the	unity	of	their	political	party	above	the	interests	of	the	country.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Jim	Gallagher	is	Visiting	Professor	of	Government	at	Glasgow	University	and	an	Associate	Member	at	Nuffield
College,	Oxford.	
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